Poor Relations: The Effect of Second Families on Child Support by Fodden, Simon R.
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University 
Osgoode Digital Commons 
Articles & Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship 
1980 
Poor Relations: The Effect of Second Families on Child Support 
Simon R. Fodden 
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University 
Source Publication: 
Canadian Journal of Family Law. Volume 3, Numbers 2/3 (1980), p. 207-218. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative 
Works 4.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
Fodden, Simon R. "Poor Relations: The Effect of Second Families on Child Support." Canadian Journal of 
Family Law 3.2/3 (1980): 207-218. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital 
Commons. 
POOR RELATIONS:
THE EFFECT OF SECOND
FAMILIES ON CHILD SUPPORT
Simon R. Fodden*
With the increasing divorce rate in Canada, the incidence of remarriage has begun to
climb. One of the consequences of this establishment of second families is that Courts
have been confronted with decisions how, if at all, the newly acquired voluntary sup-
port duties of the prime obligor toward his second family affect his subsisting obliga-
tions to the first family, and particularly the children of that first family. Regrettably,
current jurisprudential wisdom favours the exercise of broad, judicial disretion; at best,
the remarriage and its train of new obligations is but afactor to which it is not presently
possible to attach any guaranteed weight.t
INTRODUCTION
The law of child support shares a deceptive simplicity with almost every
other aspect of family law. Child custody is governed by that brief stan-
dard, "best interests of the child". Spousal maintenance may turn on what
is "fit and just". Even matrimonial property is frequently divided equally,
unless to do so would be "inequitable". The child seeking support bran-
dishes that Marxist aphorism: "From Mum and Dad according to ability; to
me according to need." These simple standards, however, do little more
than to flag problems. The most important matter in child support is deter-
mination of quantum, but in calculation, the maxim helps not at all. The
Simon R. Fodden, A.B., LL.B., is a Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University, Toronto, Ontario. He is a frequent speaker, lecturer, instructor and panelist
on matters of family and children's law before various bar associations and judicial
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t Alors que le taux des divorces s'dl~ve au Canada, le nombre des remariages a aussi
commenc6 t augmenter. En cons&quence, les tribunaux doivent decider si les nouvclles
obligations volontairement assum~es par le chef de famille doivent affecter le devoir de
soutien dfi A la premire famille. Malheureusement, la jurisprudence favorise A present
I'exercice d'une discrision judiciaire tr~s &endue: le remariage et ses nouvelles obligations
ne reprbsentent qu'un des facteurs considirs et il est impossible d'dvaluer avec certitude
l'importance que les tribunaux y attacheront. (Trad. H. BarbSs)
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Courts must retreat behind the shield that both signifies and protects their
discretion: Each case must be decided on its own merits.
Total discretion, like any complete freedom, is impossible to bear. This is
as true for lawyers who must advise clients and argue before the Courts as it
if for the Courts themselves. And there are lawyers and Judges who make
appeals to standards of various kinds to justify their proposals and decisions
in this discretionary matter. Indeed, that lawyers argue and Courts write
reasons for judgment is interesting. Once within the core of discretion, iso-
lated from any other case by the incomparable facts of a given case, there is
nothing rational to be said; for rational argument is an appeal to standards,
to rules however diffuse. Combinations of the facts and various possible
outcomes can be discussed, of course, but as soon as a lawyer says that one
outcome is preferable to another for reasons other than that his or her client
prefers it, he or she is inviting the Judge to be guided by a norm or standard.
As soon as a Judge supports his or her judgment with anything other than a
statement that he or she thinks that it is correct, he or she is appealing to a
standard. Both lawyers and Judges constantly break the silence of dis-
cretion.
This is not entirely surprising. For one thing, to try to persuade another
that one is correct is a natural emotional response. Where rational argument
is not available, however, one will appeal to emotions. For another thing,
complete discretion is impossible and perhaps undesirable in the law. It is
impossible because each Judge comes to a case and a set of facts with pre-
judices, conscious or unconscious. Prejudices are, after all, pre-judgments
and operate like rules in this respect. An honest Judge may feel the need to
raise and make explicit his or her prejudices. In fact, no one would want dis-
cretion exercised by beings from Mars, lacking in Earthly prejudices. One
wants decisions to be clustered about one's social norms, not random-
seeming. A discretionary act can be overturned by a higher Court on the
basis that no reasonable jury or Judge would have come to that conclusion.
This means that there is some value in examining the entrails of discre-
tion, the "indiscretions" of the lawyers and Judges involved in the process.
The author says "some value" because it is impossible to grasp these indis-
cretions tightly and to compress them into rules - because, the more firmly
one presses, the more likely are their creators to disappear down the escape-
hatch labelled "Each case on its merits". The value surely lies in making
lawyers and Judges aware of their own appeals to standards and social
norms, so that they might reflect on these outside the context of a given
case. As well, there may be commonalities in these appeals to standards that
suggest that the time is right for rule-making. In this respect, discretion may
be like a social furnace in which new common ways of proceeding can
emerge into rules through legislative intervention.
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1: THE RISING INCIDENCE OF REMARRIAGE AFTER DIVORCE
One aspect of the law of child support that has received a fair bit of atten-
tion in the jurisprudence is the problem of second families and their in-
fluence on quantum. The formation of second families seems to be increas-
ing in Canada. The divorce statistics suggest as much.I The correspondence
between marriage breakdown and divorce is, of course, not perfect, but it
would seem to be the case since the passage of the federal Divorce Act' of
1968 that the divorce rate reflects the rate of marriage breakdown. Since the
focus is on second families, that is, families in which one parent has been
divorced, the cumulative effect of the divorce rate is important. Once
divorced, a person remains thereafter a divorced person. If one makes the
conservative (if uncharitable) assumption that a person only lives ten years
after a divorce, it is not unreasonable to estimate that there are now just
under one million people in Canada who can claim that status. That is peri-
lously close to one in every thirteen adults.3 By contrast, demographers have
calculated that in 1971 there were only 154,000 divorced people in Canada,'
or something like one in every seventy adults.
These divorced people are remarrying. In 1966, 4.6% of all bridegrooms
and 4.3% of all brides had been once divorced. In 1974, the numbers had
risen to 10.7% and 9.6% respectively.s This means that well over 107 of all
marriages form second families. 6 These figures do not take into account in-
formal unions, which local observation suggests are increasing in number.
It was not possible to discover how many second families involve children,
but it is known that 60% of divorces involve dependent children and that
percentage, too, seems on the increase.7 That does not take into account
1. The number of divorce decrees has continued to rise every year since 1970. (There was an
initial burst of petitions when the Divorce Act, infra fn. 2, came into force in 1968,
causing a slight drop for 1970.) This rise has kept well ahead of population growth, as the
divorce rate per 100,000 population reveals; 1968: 54; 1969: 124; 1970: 139; 1971: 137;
1972: 48; 1973: 166; 1974: 200; 1975: 222. See Canada Year Book 1978.79, (Ottawa:
Ministry of Industry, Trade & Commerce, 1978), at 167.
2. S.C. 1967-68, c. 24; now R.S.C. 1970, c. D-8.
3. In 1976, there were just over 9,000,000 children in Canada. I f one accepts a total popula-
tion of 22,000,000 at that time, it would have left 11,000,000 adults. Figures are based on
Bulletins 4.2 (Families by Size) and 4.4 (Families by Number of Children) in the 1976
Census of Canada: Vol. 4 - Families (Ottawa: Ministry of Industry, Trade & Com-
merce, 1978).
4. John F. Peters: "Divorce in Canada - A Demographic Profile" (1976), 7 J. Comp.
Fam. Studies 335 at 345.
5. Sylvia T. Wargon: Canadian Households and Families (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1979),
at 89.
6. It would be unreasonable to expect that divorced brides marry only divorced bride-
grooms. The extent to which this does happen, however, is unknown.
7. Peters, supra fn. 4, at 340.
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those children born into second families. To conclude, second family for-
mation is already at a significant rate and that rate appears to be increasing.
Children are heavily caught up in this rise of serial monogamy.
2: THE EFFECT OF REMARRIAGE ON EXISTING SUPPORT OBLI-
GATIONS
In attempting to assess the law's response to this phenomenon, the author
examined some twenty two reported Canadian cases that, with one excep-
tion, were decided within the last ten years.' The author's principal concern
was: in considering child support, to what extent and how do Courts take
into account members' joining the family after breakup. The issue arises in
these cases in a variety of ways. It may be that the arrival of a new member
is merely anticipated by the Courts, as when, for example, an award to sup-
port for a wife with custody is made contingent on her not living with
another man as husband and wife.9 It may be that the father or mother is al-
ready living with another person at the time that child support is first dealt
with.'I Typically, it arises by way of application to vary an order in light of
changed circumstances.
With perhaps one exception, all of the cases reviewed say that the arrival
of a new family member may be a factor to be taken into account in any cal-
culation or adjustment of quantum. Put in another way, there is no rule
8. Auzat v. deManche (1971), 6 R.F.L. 119 (Que. Super. Ct);
Baker v. Baker (1975), 25 R.F.L. 238 (Ont. H.C.);
Belof v. Belof(1972), 9 R.F.L. 60 (Sask. Q.B.);
Coe v. Coe (1978), 1 R.F.L. (2d) 173 (Ont. H.C.);
Coghill v. Coghill (1975), 21 R.F.L. 353 (Sask. Q.B.);
Conroy v. Conroy (1977), 1 R.F.L. (2d) 193 (Ont. H.C.);
Davis v. Colter(1973), 12 R.F.L. 84 (Sask. Q.B.);
Epstein v. Epstein (1976), 30 R.F.L. 86 (Ont. H.C.);
Gelgoot v. Gelgoot (1977), 1 R.F.L. (2d) 204 (Ont. H.C.);
Impey v. Impey (1973), 13 R.F.L. 240 (Sask. Q.B.);
Ireland v. Ireland (1969), 70 W.W.R. I (Sask. Q.B.);
Jans v. Page (1976), 29 R.F.L. 210, 1 Fam. L. Rev. 136 (On. Prov. Ct, Fam. Div.);
Kinghorn v. Kinghorn andMichel (1960), 34 W.W.R. 123, 29 D.L.R. (2d) 168 (Sask.
Q.13.);
Kleiner v. Kleiner (1975), 26 R.F.L. 254 (Ont. C.A.);
MacDonald v. Lee (1970), 2 N.S.R. (2d) 301,2 R.F.L. 360 (N.S. App. Div.);
MacDougall v. MacDougall (1973), 11 R.F.L. 266 (Ont. H.C.);
McKeller v. McKeller (1972), 7 R.F.L. 207 (Ont. C.A.);
ReMcKenna and McKenna (1974), 2 O.R. (2d) 571,43 D.L.R. (3d) 515, 14 R.F.L. 153
(Ont. H.C.);
McQuilkin v. Dawson, 11975] C.A. 849, 62 D.L.R. (3d) 381 (Que. C.A.);
Osborne v. Osborne and Hilton (1974), 14 R.F.L. 149 (Ont. H.C.);
Tobin v. Tobin (1974), 19 R.F.L. 18 (Ont. H.C.);
Turnerv. Turner and Seadon (1972), 8 R.F.L. 15 (Man. Q.B.)
9. See, for example, Gelgoot v. Gelgoot, supra fn. 8.
10. See, for example, Conroy v. Conroy, supra fn. 8.
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governing the matter. There might have been a rule excluding the needs or
means of a new family member from the calculation of quantum. If the pro-
blem were socially significant, there would probably be a rule, for example,
excluding a father's gambling expenses from consideration; on an applica-
tion to reduce an award, a new-found love for "playing the ponies" would
not represent a material change in circumstances.
One case comes close to taking this position. In MacDougall v. Mac-
Dougall, " a man sought reduction in the amount of maintenance that he
was paying to his former wife. He himself had no children, although his
former wife had one and his second wife had two. He built his case about an
increase in his former wife's salary. The Ontario High Court denied his ap-
plication. The fact that he had remarried was not, the Court said, substan-
tially argued by his counsel, but the Court volunteered this statement:2
... I do not accept any principle that would permit the former husband to
bring about a reduction of his maintenance obligations under an order of
this Court by voluntarily increasing his other obligations.
It would be possible to regard this as obiter, but a point not substantially
argued was at least advanced. There is, nevertheless, a trace of ambiguity in
this pronouncement. Was the Court rejecting a rule that would automati-
cally entitle a man to a reduction? Or was the Court adopting a rule that
prevents his even arguing for a reduction? If it is the former, then there is
nothing surprising in this; once something is admitted to be a factor in the
discretionary decision about quantum, there is no guarantee that the factor
will have any particular degree of effect. In other words, it is only a factor.
If it is the latter, however, then the recent authorities are uniformly opposed
to this stand.'
3
Historically, there was a consensus for the ruling out of such consider-
ations by the Courts. For example, in 1924, the Supreme Court of British
Columbia asserted that an ex-husband's liability to his first family was not
to be prejudiced by the "predicament" into which he had gotten himself by
contracting a second marriage.' That principle was repeated in 1938 by the
Trial Division of the Alberta Supreme Court.'
11. Supra fn. 8.
12. Id., at 271, per Henry, J.
13. See, for example, McKeller v. McKeller, supra fn. 8, in which the Ontario Court of
Appeal per Brooke, J.A., said at 208 that the man's remarriage "is not ahvays a reason to
require" his first family to accept less; (author's own emphasis added). The clear implica-
tion is that it may sometimes be a reason; that is. it is not necessarily "ruled out of
Court".
14. Moody v. Moody (1924), 34 B.C.R. 49 (B.C.S.C.).
15. Edwards v. Edwards, [1938] 1 W.W.R. 880, [1938] 2 D.L.R. 786n (Alta Tr. Div.).
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While that statement from MacDougall v. MacDougall may stand alone
as a prohibition today, it expressed a view with which a number of recent
cases have sympathy. The Courts in these cases have accepted the intro-
duction of a new family member as a possible factor in reducing quantum
for the first family, but have made angry noises while doing so.II The atti-
tude of the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench in the case of Kinghorn
v. Kinghorn and Michel'7 is typical of this grudging acceptance. The Court
admonished a man who sought a reduction in his support obligations upon
his remarriage: I
The applicant should not be permitted to shun the marital obligations
arising out of the first marriage by entering into another marriage, and the
mere fact that he saw fit to do so gives him no ground in itself for seeking
an order to reduce his liabilities to his first wife and child. He cannot
expect his first wife and child to subsidize his second marriage.
But then the Court relented and said: 1
9
... it is a circumstance to be considered ... and may under some circum-
stances warrant a reduction.
The Court finally reduced his payments from $75 to $60 per month.
This Saskatchewan case is typical in another respect, for it is rife with
judicial statements about how the factor of remarriage may operate. These
are the "indiscretions" referred to earlier, those statements of principle,
direct or indirect, that interfere with pure discretion. For instance, the Sas-
katchewan Court said that, while remarriage of the father may be a factor,
he would not be permitted to "shun" his prior obligations. In a much later
case, the same Court repeated that remarriage is a factor but warned that it
would not permit the father to "shuck his responsibility.., by the pleasant
expedient of remarrying" . This talk of "shunning" and "shucking" is of
little help, except to caution that attitudes are hostile and that the costs of
remarrying may be discounted out of disapproval.
More apparently helpful are statements concerning priority. In Kinghorn
v. Kinghorn and Michel, the Court maintained that the first family was to
receive first consideration. That point was repeated by the Saskatchewan
Court of Queen's Bench in a later case.2 ' In a 1978 decision, the Ontario
16. See, for example, Davis v. Colter, Ireland v. Ireland, Kinghorn v. Kinghorn and Michel,
McKeller v. McKeller and McQuilkin v. Dawson, supra fn. 8.
17. Supra fn. 8.
18. Id., at 125 (W.W.R.), 170 (D.L.R.), per Disbery, J.
19. Id., at 126 (W.W.R.), 171 (D.L.R.).
20. Davis v. Colter, supra fn. 8, at 89, per Disbery, J.
21. Id.
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High Court stated that the father's counsel acknowledged that "the chil-
dren of the first marriage should normally be given some priority". 22 In
another Ontario case, the mother's counsel argued that the father's
"primary responsibility is to the child of the first marriage"." And the
Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench simply said, "The question may be one
of priority."""
To what extent do statements about priority actually offer any assistance
to those who must argue and decide? First, there is confusion about who
exactly is to receive priority and second, it is unclear what the subject matter
of any priority should be. By way of illustration, it may be instructive to as-
sume the least confusing set of facts." Suppose that a former wife has cus-
tody of the children whose father has been ordered to pay child support.
The father remarries. Both his first and his second wives are working.
Who might get priority over whom? One might choose to give his chil-
dren priority over him, or over his second wife, or over the second family as
a whole. Or, one might choose to give the first family as a whole priority
over any member of the second family. And what is the subject matter of
the priority? It could be priority in the father's income, or in his income
after some deduction for some of his needs, or priority in standard of living.
As soon as one selects any combination of these possibilities, problems
develop. Can one begin by saying that the children should be given priority
over their father in his income; that is, should they get more of his income
than does he? It is worth noting here that, even upon breakup of the ori-
ginal family, children are rarely, if ever, accorded this high priority.2 6 To
this proposal, the father in this example would surely object on the grounds
that the mother has an obligation to support them too. This may indeed be a
legitimate criticism, for there is not simply a father-child support obliga-
tion, but a mother-child one as well. But as soon as this is conceded and this
22. Coe v. Coe, supra fn. 8, at 176, per Osler, J. paraphrasing the submissions of Michael J.
Siddons, Esq.
23. Re McKenna and McKenna, supra fn. 8, at 572 (O.R.), 516 (D.L.R.), 154 (R.F.L.). per
Weatherston, J. paraphrasing the submissions of R.G. Chapman, Esq.
24. Turnerv. Turner and Seadon, supra fn. 8, at 16, per Deniset, J.
25. The cases of Auzat v. de Manche, Belof v. Belof and Kinghorn v. Kinghorn and Michel,
supra fn. 8, had fact situations that approximated this scenario to the extent that there
were no other children in the second family. In all these cases, a reduction was allowved by
the Court.
But see MacDougall v. MacDougall and McKeller v. McKeller, supra fn. 8, where the
men had stronger cases as there were children in the second family and yet no reduction
was permitted.
26. See, for example, Gelgoot v. Gelgool, supra fn. 8, where the Ontario High Court per
Morand, J., said at 207:
Awards in circumstances of these kinds covering the wife and children usually
vary somewhere between one-third to one-half of the gross income of the
respondent husband.
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further obligation taken into account, the simple notion of priority is
ruined, since the mother's situation must now be considered as well. The
difficulty with that, however, is that the mother's contribution to the chil-
dren is not segregated in the form of a visible Court order and it is impos-
sible for her not to benefit from any moneys intended to benefit her
children.
Is is possible, then, to move up one level to compare families and to
accord priority in standard of living to the first family? To that, the second
wife may object because her income would effectively be used to subsidise a
family to which she owes no obligation. This can be appreciated more
clearly if the example has an additional fact, namely that the income of the
second wife is steadily rising. As it rises, it increases the second family's
standard of living. As that standard rises, the husband's offsetting pay-
ments must increase to maintain the first family's priority in living stan-
dards, until eventually he is diverting all of his salary to the first family. At
that point, it is clear that he is failing in his legal obligation to contribute to
the support of his current family.
So long as there is a meaning given to all of the legal obligations that may
exist, no notion of priority will work in any useful way, simply because rules
of priority operate on one plane, and not "in the round". They are able to
rank entities, but only along one scale; that is, only those entities that are re-
lated by one value. In the two-family problem, there is a cluster of legal ob-
ligations to provide support, all pulling in different directions. As soon as
one is settled, there is an dislocation in each of the others; to settle them one
at a time would involve pretending that the others did not exist. So typic-
ally, each is given a nod and then, a global solution superimposed. In the
cases examined by the author, the Courts have not been prepared to ignore
the other competing obligations and any talk of priority has been either an
empty or ritual disapproval of a man who has increased his obligations.
A notion similar to priority was raised in an application for child support
before the Ontario High Court. 7 The original parents had been divorced
and both had remarried. The mother had custody of the only child of the
first marriage and the father had three children by his second wife. The
Court, in response to a submission by the mother's counsel that the father's
primary responsibility was the child of the first union, purported to require
the father to treat his children equally:2"
All children have an equal claim to support from their father, and the
Court, when determining the amount of maintenance to be paid, should
permit and require a father to treat all his children fairly and equally.
27, Re McKenna and McKenna, supra fn. 8.
28. Id., at 573 (O.R.), 517 (D.L.R.), 155 (R.F.L.),perWeaterston, J.
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When one looks at the arithmetic of the judgment, however, it is impos-
sible to say in what respect the children were treated equally. The first
family with three members had a total income of $27,500 per year (Si,000 in
support from the child's father, $8,500 earned by the mother and $18,000
earned by her new husband). The second family of five had to content itself
with $11,000, the remainder of the father's income of S12,000 per year.
Looked at from the point of view of the father's contribution, the result was
that his first child received $1,000 per year; that left him $11,000 to spend
on his other three children, his second wife and himself. How is one to
judge the portion attributable to them or enjoyed by them? This is not to
say that the decision was wrong - one would need standards for that judg-
ment - merely that there is no discernable equality. 9
If there are not effective standards to guide discretion generally, are there
certain factors that are given more weight than others in these cases? Not
surprisingly, the Courts show a greater willingness to reduce an award when
the man's request for reduction is based on an increase in the mother's
means rather than an increase in his own needs. That increase in the
mother's means usually comes about through her remarriage,"' and the
Courts recognise without cavil that this pooling of resources eases her finan-
cial situation. Put another way, despite the lack of any legal obligation be-
tween the children and the second husband, his resources are seen to flow to
them through their mother. But this can be seen to be so only because of the
legal obligation between the mother and her second husband. The Ontario
Court of Appeal said as much in a case in which the mother had married the
man with whom she had been living:'I
While it is true that there may have been similar financial arrangements
before and after marriage, nevertheless, with the marriage, some arrange-
ments became obligations.
In the case of fathers' second families, none of the Canadian cases under
study indicated how the Courts would treat an informal union as opposed
to a legal remarriage. All the cases uncovered by the author dealt with re-
marriage. But on the basis of the repeated references to their obligations to
support their wives, one can speculate that a legal marriage may be a signifi-
cant factor. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the cases showed no distinc-
tion in treatment between children born into the second family and those
brought into it by the second wife. Thus, even where they are not his chil-
dren, the Courts accept that they are in fact an economic burden on the
29. See also Jans v. Page, supra fn. 8.
30. See Impey v. Impey, Kleiner v. Kleiner, MacDonald r. Lee and Re McKenna and
McKenna, supra fn. 8.
31. Kleiner v. Kleiner, supra fn. 8, at 254-255, per Brooke, J.A.
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man. In a recent Ontario case, for instance, a father married a woman with
two children and had two further children by her. The Ontario High Court
simply summed up by saying:
32
In other words, he has four children and a wife to support in addition to
the two children for whose benefit the maintenance order... was made.
Another related factor should be pointed out. On applications to reduce
maintenance, Courts have paid close attention to the time when the second
union began. They have required proof of a change in circumstances, and if
the second union was in existence or even in contemplation at the time the
original order was made, it may not be regarded as a factor to establish a
change in circumstances. The recent Ontario case of Epstein v. Epstein"
was the clearest example of this. There, the decrees nisi and absolute were
issued on the same day. Eleven days later, the father remarried and twenty
days after the issue of the decrees, his new wife gave birth to a child. He
applied the following month for a reduction in the order to which he had
consented scarcely two months earlier. The Court castigated both him and
his counsel and declared:" '
It is impossible for me to understand how these developments could be de-
scribed as "changed circumstances" when they must clearly have been in
the contemplation of [the husband] ...
In another instance, the Quebec Superior Court took into account against a
husband the fact that, at the time that the original settlement with his first
wife was negotiated, he was already serious about the woman whom he
shortly thereafter married." And the Ontario High Court dismissed a man's
application for maintenance reduction because, when the decree nisi was
made, he was living with the woman to whom he was now married.
6
For these Courts, financial rather than legal relations were important.
Presumably, therefore, when the original order was made, they would have
taken into account the fact that the husband's ability had been reduced
because he was living with (or contemplated living with) another woman.
For other Courts, however, it has been the legal obligations between the
man and the woman with whom he was living that have been significant. In
the case of Kleiner v. Kleiner," the Ontario Court of Appeal said that the
fact of remarriage, when "arrangements became obligations", was a
32. Coe v. Coe, supra fn. 8, at 176, per Osler, J.
33. Suprafn.8.
34. Id., at 87, per Maloney, J.
35. Auzat v. de Manche, supra fn. 8.
36. Baker v. Baker, supra fn. 8. See also Coghill v. Coghill, supra fn. 8.
37. Supra fn. 8.
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change in circumstances, even though the actual financial arrangements
before and after marriage were similar.
There is, thus, an ambiguity about the significance of legal remarriage.
If, for example, an original application for support were to be brought
before a Court that followed the view taken in Kleiner v. Kleiner, the Court
might disregard an informal second union as involving merely "arrange-
ments" and not "obligations". If that informal union subsequently became
a legal marriage and if the man were unfortunate enough to have his request
for variation scheduled before a Court of a persuasion similar to that in
Epstein v. Epstein, then that Court would find no change in circumstances.
To avoid this injustice, either the financial arrangements or the legal obliga-
tions must be considered as significant, but not both.
One final factor is the existence of a third family. In two of the cases
under study involving a man's remarriage to a woman with children, the
woman's former husband had been ordered to support those children." In
neither case was he paying and in neither did the Courts press the matter. In
other cases, where it might have been raised, the Court did not discuss this
third-family connection. 39 Yet, it takes no stretch of the immagination to
turn the question of child support into a four-family problem; all that is
needed is the breakdown of the marriage of two divorced people with
children. But to cope in any useful way with the logistics of a three-family
problem, let alone a four-family problem, would seem beyond the resources
of the party-based adversarial system. The multiplicity of obligations and
the permutations of possible solutions would dictate either a simpler system
of decision making or, as now happens, a relaxation of some obligations.
CONCLUSION
At a time when relevant but difficult legal obligations are being ignored,
new ones are being legislated into existence. In particular, recent family law
reform legislation in several provinces has created support obligations
between "spouses" and has provided several means by which one can be-
come a "spouse", only one of which involves a legal marriage." It is
38. Davis v. Colter and Turner v. Turner and Seadon, supra fn. 8.
39. See Coe v. Coe, Impey v. Impey, Osborne v. Osborne and Hilton and Tobin v. Tobin,
supra fn. 8.
40. British Columbia: section I of the Family RelationsAct, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 121;
Manitoba: section 11 of The Family Maintenance Act, 1978, c. 25;
Newfoundland: section 10A of The Maintenance Act, R.S.N. 1970, c. 223, as added by
1973, No. 119;
Nova Scotia: paragraph l(l)(d) of the Wives'and Children's MaintenanceAct, R.S.N.S.
1967, c. 341, as amended by 1970, c. 98; 1970-71, c. 65; and 1977, c. 18;
Ontario: paragraph 14(b) of TheFamily Law Reform Act, 1978, c. 2.
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possible under this legislation for a child to acquire parents obliged to
support him or her through means other than biological descent. 4' Children
can have more than two parents and an adult more than one spouse. These
statutes have offered no method of creating priorities among all these
obligors and dependants, and, as has been pointed out, that should not be
surprising.
It is important to realise that these new statutory support obligations
might be invoked in the context of an application to vary maintenance. To
the extent that a Court is prepared to be moved by the existence of a legal
obligation, these provincial obligations could become factors.42 It would be
open to a man to argue, for example, that the new husband of his former
wife has treated his children in such a way that this new husband is now
obliged to support them. The invocation of this new obligation would not
seem to require a direct application for support on behalf of the child.
The author is chary of the ever-widening net of obligations and financial
repercussions that the law of child support seems to entail and he is sceptical
of the legal system's ability to manage them. Relations are being created in
law faster than society can find names for them. That in itself ought to be a
sign that the law may be moving too quickly. In an area that is truly dis-
cretionary at its core, one has no way of judging the correctness of the
Courts' decisions. That is what discretion means. It is difficult enough to
grapple with an ordinary two-family problem. Only when it is better known
what should be done in such cases ought the net of obligationed be ex-
panded. Canadian Courts and lawyers have only had a decade to consider
the two-family problem with any degree of frequency. And so as the cases
have revealed, there has as yet been little useful in the escape of "indiscre-
tion" from the uniqueness of each case.
41. British Columbia: sections I and 56 of the Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 121;
Manitoba: paragraph I(a) and section 12 of The Family Maintenance Act, 1978, c. 25;
New Brunswick: sections 1 and 2 of the Deserted Wives and Children Maintenance Act,
R.S.N.B. 1973, c. D-8;
Newfoundland: paragraph 2(b) and section 5 of The Maintenance Act, R.S.N. 1970, c.
223, as amended by 1971, No. 71; 1973, Nos. 31 and 119; and 1974, No. 8;
Northwest Territories: paragraph 2(a) and subsection 3(2) of the Maintenance Ordinance,
R.O.N.W.T. 1974, c. M-2;
Ontario: paragraph 1(a) and section 16 of TheFamily Law Reform Act, 1978, c. 2;
Prince Edward Island: paragraph 2(a) and section 17 of the Family Law Reform Act,
1978, c. 6;
Yukon Territory: subsection 2(l) and section 3 of the Maintenance Ordinance, R.O.Y.T.
1971, c. M-2.
42. The author has avoided discussion of any constitutional complications. It is possible that
there are families who have been once divorced under the federal Divorce Act, supra
fn. 2, and thereafter subject to the provisions of that Act. Families who had not been
divorced yet or who had not been divorced in Canada are still subject to the provincial
support laws.
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